The reading is worth as much as the sending here: because the bridge keeps your history in a local database instead of fetching it each time, years of chats turn into something you can ask questions of. Replying, sending files and leaving a voice note then go out over the same connection your phone already trusts, so nothing has to be re-authorised per action.
A server for a personal WhatsApp account. It links the way WhatsApp Web does, by scanning a code with your phone, and keeps the message history in a local database — so searching years of chats happens on your machine, and only what the agent actually asks for reaches the model.
- Contacts searched by name or phone number
- Messages listed with filters, and the surrounding context of any single one
- Chats listed with their metadata, opened by contact, or reduced to the last thing exchanged with someone
- Every chat a given contact appears in, direct or group
- Messages sent to a person or to a group
- Files sent — images, video, documents, audio
- Audio sent as a playable voice message rather than an attachment
- Media from a received message downloaded to a local path you can hand to another tool
- Your phone, to scan the link code — and to scan again when the link lapses
- Go and Python toolchains. It runs as two processes: a bridge that holds the WhatsApp connection and stores messages, and the server your client talks to. Both have to be up
- On Windows, a C compiler with cgo turned on before the bridge will build — without it the build fails on the local database driver
- For voice messages, audio already in Opus form, or ffmpeg installed so it can convert. Without either you can still send the file, it just will not be playable in the chat
- It reads private messages and can send them, which is the shape prompt injection exploits — the README says so directly. Keep untrusted content out of any conversation this is connected to
