The signal this is built around is a package with one person holding publish rights and an enormous install base, which is the shape the recent token-theft incidents took and which no vulnerability scanner surfaces, because it is not a vulnerability. audit_dependency_tree is the one to reach for rather than reading a manifest: the packages carrying this risk are usually transitive.
A supply-chain risk service exposed over MCP. It scores npm and PyPI packages, Rust crates, Go modules and GitHub repositories on behaviour that is hard to fake, and flags the concentration pattern where one publisher controls a package that everything depends on.
- A batch of packages audited at once across npm, PyPI, Cargo and Go (audit_dependencies)
- A GitHub repository's manifest fetched and every dependency in it audited (audit_github_repo)
- An npm package's full dependency tree mapped, so transitive risk surfaces instead of hiding in the lock file (audit_dependency_tree)
- A single package profiled on its own, per ecosystem (lookup_npm_package, lookup_pypi_package, lookup_cargo_crate, lookup_go_module)
- A repository scored on longevity, commit frequency and contributor depth (lookup_github_repo)
- Scores built from longevity, publisher depth, release consistency, download trend and OpenSSF Scorecard, with risk flags attached
- A free key created from inside the chat, without opening a browser (get_api_key)
- Company lookups against the Norwegian business register, by name or by organisation number (lookup_business, lookup_business_by_org)
Nothing to install — it is a hosted server you point your client at by URL. Anonymous use is rate limited per address; a free key raises that, and can be created from the conversation itself.
One command — npx -y mcp-remote https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcp