attack-tree-construction

★ 37,559

by wshobson · part of wshobson/agents

Build comprehensive attack trees to visualize threat paths. Use when mapping attack scenarios, identifying defense gaps, or communicating security risks to stakeholders.

🧩 One of 7 skills in the wshobson/agents package — works on its own, and pairs well with its siblings.

This is the playbook your agent receives when the skill activates — you don't need to read it to use the skill, but it's here to audit before installing.

Attack Tree Construction

Systematic attack path visualization and analysis.

When to Use This Skill

Visualizing complex attack scenarios
Identifying defense gaps and priorities
Communicating risks to stakeholders
Planning defensive investments
Penetration test planning
Security architecture review

Core Concepts

1. Attack Tree Structure

                    [Root Goal]
                         |
            ┌────────────┴────────────┐
            │                         │
       [Sub-goal 1]              [Sub-goal 2]
       (OR node)                 (AND node)
            │                         │
      ┌─────┴─────┐             ┌─────┴─────┐
      │           │             │           │
   [Attack]   [Attack]      [Attack]   [Attack]
    (leaf)     (leaf)        (leaf)     (leaf)

2. Node Types

Type	Symbol	Description
OR	Oval	Any child achieves goal
AND	Rectangle	All children required
Leaf	Box	Atomic attack step

3. Attack Attributes

Attribute	Description	Values
Cost	Resources needed	$, $$, $$$
Time	Duration to execute	Hours, Days, Weeks
Skill	Expertise required	Low, Medium, High
Detection	Likelihood of detection	Low, Medium, High

Templates and detailed worked examples

Full template library lives in references/details.md. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.

Best Practices

Do's

Start with clear goals - Define what attacker wants
Be exhaustive - Consider all attack vectors
Attribute attacks - Cost, skill, and detection
Update regularly - New threats emerge
Validate with experts - Red team review

Don'ts

Don't oversimplify - Real attacks are complex
Don't ignore dependencies - AND nodes matter
Don't forget insider threats - Not all attackers are external
Don't skip mitigations - Trees are for defense planning
Don't make it static - Threat landscape evolves